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Local Firms in Madagascar’s Apparel Export Sector: 
Technological Capabilities and Participation in Global Value Chains 
Introduction 
Structural transformation involves a process of attracting human and physical capital out of 
unproductive and subsistence economic activities into more productive activities and 
enterprises. Thus many development economists define structural transformation as moving 
from low to high productivity economic activities (Lin 2012; Page 2012). However, this 
definition does not focus on the underlying processes that drive and sustain productivity 
growth. Another set of development economists, such as Alice Amsden (2001), argued that 
structural change involves moving the economy away from being a set of assets based on 
primary products exploited by unskilled labor toward an economy built on knowledge-based 
assets exploited by skilled labor. The term technological capabilities is used by other scholars 
to refer to these knowledge-based assets—the technical, organizational, and managerial skills 
necessary to achieve international levels of efficiency and quality.  
For structural transformation to be sustainable, it cannot be driven entirely by foreign firms, 
but needs to also involve locally owned firms building their technological capabilities. 
Ownership matters. Foreign firms can leave when conditions internal and external to the host 
country change; whereas local firm owners are compelled to upgrade or shift into new activities 
and sectors. The higher technological capabilities locally owned firms have, the greater their 
ability to sustain national income growth by moving into higher value economic activities as 
well as responding flexibly to changes in domestic and international competition. Hence, if 
industrialization is pioneered by, and composed of largely or only foreign firms, then industries 
and hence structural transformation will not be sustainable, and there will be few backward 
and forward linkages within the economy, which generate further jobs and spread the wealth 
generated from export sectors.  
This working paper analyzes the nature and level of technological capabilities among local 
firms in the Madagascar apparel export industry and their positions within apparel global value 
chains. African countries have very limited manufacturing experience historically compared to 
other parts of the world and for this reason face greater challenges in achieving structural 
transformation (Amsden 2008; Whitfield et al. 2015: 90-95). The apparel export industry is 
typically one of the first export sectors for less developed countries, especially in 
manufacturing, because it is labor-intensive and the technology in apparel assembly is mature 
and standardized. Thus, apparel is often perceived as an easy export sector to enter, but in the 
context of late-late industrialization which African countries face, it is still rather complex. 
First, preferential market access is still important for less developed countries to enter apparel 
exporting but its role as a competitive advantage has declined given the Multi-Fiber 
Arrangement quota phase out end of 2004 and the ongoing process of tariff preference erosion, 
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as more and more countries enjoy tariff preferences in the context of trade agreements (Bair 
2008; Staritz 2011). Second, the requirements of global buyers that are the lead firms in apparel 
global value chains have become more stringent, leading to small margins for error for their 
supplier firms. As lead firms focus on core competencies such as design, marketing, and 
retailing, they demand more functions from their suppliers: not just manufacturing but also 
other processes such as input sourcing, stock holding, financing, logistics, and product 
development (Abernathy et al. 1999; Gereffi 1999; Palpacuer et el. 2005; Staritz 2011). In this 
context, global buyers also aim to have direct relationships with their suppliers, cutting out 
middlemen such as agents, which demands further functions from supplier firms. Third, there 
is tough international competition as many less income countries are integrated or aim to 
integrate in the apparel sector. Supplier firms in Asian but also from regional supplier countries 
- Central and Eastern Europe and North Africa for Europe and Central America for the United
States (US) - are competitive, which includes offering broader capabilities that buyers
increasingly demand (Frederick and Staritz 2011).
In a previous working paper, we identified what technological capabilities firms are required 
to have in the apparel global value chain at varying levels of functions and complexity (Staritz 
and Whitfield 2017). The conceptualization and operationalization of technological 
capabilities within apparel global value chains is further developed in this paper in order to 
measure and analyze local firms’ capabilities, taking into account different firm trajectories. 
The first section provides an overview of the emergence of the apparel export sector in 
Madagascar in general and the local apparel exporting firms in particular. The second section 
explains how we collected data on the technological capabilities of local firms and how it was 
analyzed in order to calculate technological capability scores for each firm. The third section 
presents the results and discusses what these scores tell us about the challenges that local firms 
face in building technological capabilities. Firm names have been anonymized; thus, 
throughout the article, and in Tables 1 and 2, we refer to A-Firm, B-Firm, and so on.  
The analysis shows that the overall technological capabilities scores of local firms in 
Madagascar’s apparel export sector are generally medium. These results are particularly 
determined by the specific product specialization of local firms in niche and higher value 
products and related buyers, end-markets and global value chain dynamics. Technological 
capabilities overall scores are correlated with the different types of local ownership. Firms with 
the highest technological capability scores are European-diaspora firms, and firms with 
medium range technological capabilities scores are more likely to be Indian-origin Malagasy 
firms; whereas, indigenous Malagasy firms’ scores are generally low. Indigenous Malagasy 
firms faced the highest challenges in building technological capabilities. Despite difficult 
country-specific conditions, particularly related to political instability, local apparel exporting 
firms have built significant levels of technological capabilities - but segmented along ethnic 
and product lines. The specific types of international linkages played an important role in 
capability building, particularly the specific niche and higher value product specialization that 
comes with a particular set of buyers and related global value chain dynamics as well as the 
more embedded types of foreign investment due to diaspora linkages with local firms and 
regional production strategies.  
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Emergence and evolution of Madagascar’s apparel export industry
The development of an apparel export industry in Madagascar was driven by several factors. 
In general, the key factors were relatively low labor costs and the Export Processing Zone 
(EPZ) law and incentives given to export firms, as well as foreign direct investment looking to 
take advantage of Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) quotas and preferential market access to 
the European Union (EU) under the Lomé Convention and later the Everything But Arms 
initiative and to the US under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (Morris and 
Staritz 2014). However, the key driving factor in the emergence of the industry was French 
and Mauritian foreign direct investment seeking new low-cost alternatives, but driven by 
cultural affinities and geographic proximity. Later on, Asian investment driven by MFA quota 
hopping and AGOA trade preferences became important in the industry’s growth, but this kind 
of foreign direct investment was volatile, as it was dependent on preferential access to the US 
market. The Madagascar apparel export industry was sustained by French and Mauritian firms 
as well as locally owned firms that predominantly supplied the EU market. 
Figure 1 shows the takeoff of apparel exports in Madagascar from the 1990s, the dip caused by 
the 2002 political crisis and then a rebound by 2004 at a higher value than before the crisis, but 
then another big dip due between 2008 and 2010 due to the global financial crisis and Eurozone 
crisis compounded by another political crisis in Madagascar which led to the loss of AGOA 
trade preferences in 2010. The sector began a rebound in 2011 as EU exports expanded and 
new markets were sought, especially in South Africa. Exports plateaued in 2014 and started to 
rise again after 2016 as Madagascar was reinstated as a member of AGOA, and thus exports to 
the US started again, and several Mauritian firms returned to Madagascar to restart and expand 
their factories.  
Figure 1. Total apparel and textile exports from Madagascar (in USD millions)
Source: UN COMTRADE 2018. Apparel represents HS92 61+62; textile represents HS92 50-60+63; exports 
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Inception and early development of the industry 
Madagascar had a limited foundation of textile production due to import-substitution 
industrialization policies in the 1960s and 1970s, similar to many African countries. Textile 
was one of the largest industries in the country, with six textile firms producing for the domestic 
market, which included state-owned, semi-public owned and some private companies. Growth 
of the textile industry was driven by local cotton production and processing. However, during 
the 1990s, the locally owned textile industry was decimated, again like in many African 
countries, as local firms struggled to stay competitive in the context of trade liberalization and 
the massive importation of apparel products combined with state-owned companies’ financial 
difficulties and high levels of debt due to mismanagement. The share of textile products on the 
domestic market by local companies fell from 66 percent in 1993 to 18 percent in 2002, with a 
large part of the domestic market captured by imported secondhand clothing (Maminirinarivo 
2006: 185). At the same time that local firms lost the domestic market to imports, a new export 
sector in manufacturing apparel products was emerging, which was driven by foreign direct 
investment initially but local firms were present from the beginning and over time constituted 
a significant share of apparel exporting firms.  
The Malagasy government established an EPZ in 1989 – called zone franche in Madagascar - 
as a way to attract foreign direct investment and boost exports (Fukunishi and Ramiarison 
2012). The EPZ law was initiated by the Malagasy government as part of the structural 
adjustment economic reforms pushed by the World Bank in the late 1980s, which sought to 
reorient African economies outward through trade liberalization, reduced state intervention in 
the domestic economy, and the promotion of exports as opposed to import-substitution 
industrialization policies. The idea behind the zone franche status was to attract foreign 
exchange and create jobs, and the incentive package was modelled on the Mauritian EPZ. To 
support the nascent apparel export industry, the French Caisse Centrale de Cooperation 
Economique (now Agence Française de Développement) provided funding for a training center 
that was established by some of the first EPZ apparel firms, which included several French 
firms.1 
In the EPZ law, firms were not required to locate in a specific EPZ industrial park, but rather 
granted an EPZ status and had to export at least 95 percent of their production; companies 
supplying services and inputs to EPZ companies also benefited from the scheme. Qualifying 
firms were exempt from duties on exports and imports, from excise taxes, and from profit tax 
for a grace period of two to four years followed by a fixed rate of 10 percent. However, they 
had to pay value-added tax on imported inputs, which was introduced in 1997 in order to curb 
tax evasion and to prevent companies supplying the domestic market from setting up as EPZ 
companies. The value-added tax is supposed to be refunded with a proof of exporting. EPZ 
firms were also eligible for profit tax breaks equal to 75 percent of the cost of new investments, 
and were granted special access to foreign currency and freedom to expatriate profits.  
1 Interview with the founder of a French-diaspora firm, which was one of the first apparel export firms and part 
of the training center, Antananarivo, 24 October 2016. 
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The policy was successful, and by 2001, there were 213 firms with EPZ status, with apparel 
firms accounting for the majority of firms and capital investment, and EPZ firms contributed 
10 percent of GDP (Maminirinarivo 2006: 179; Fukunishi and Ramiarison 2012). The share of 
EPZ firms in total exports rose to 42 percent by 2001, which Jean-Pierre Cling and colleagues 
(2005) note was a performance not matched by any other less developed country at that time. 
The EPZ was more successful than in other African countries not only in terms of number of 
firms but also in the sense that it spearheaded the apparel export industry and developed 
linkages with the local economy, rather than becoming an economic enclave, only exploiting 
low wages and preferential market access. It was a success because the emergence of the 
apparel export industry was driven by a specific kind of foreign direct investment and particular 
contextual factors, including geographic proximity to Mauritius and diaspora connections with 
France. The main foreign investors in export apparel firms in the 1990s were French, followed 
by Mauritian investors (Maminirinarivo 2006; Cling et al. 2005).  
French apparel corporations chose Madagascar to offshore their labor-intensive apparel 
assembly, not only because of the country’s preferential market access to the EU, EPZ 
incentives, and low labor costs, but also because of the language and the large French diaspora 
community. Mauritian apparel firms were squeezed between rising wages and the shrinking 
pool of labor in Mauritius by the early 1990s. They saw its neighboring island with a large 
population as a logical site for its most labor-intensive products such as knitted sweaters, but 
also for basic products with low unit prices, and factories could be set up with old machines as 
they upgraded machinery and moved into higher value apparel products and textile production 
in their firms in Mauritius (Gibbon 2000). This ‘delocalization’ of the Mauritian apparel 
industry created a form of triangular manufacturing in the region. Mauritian firms produced 
fabric in Mauritius and then exported it to Madagascar for use in apparel assembly, and in the 
case of woven fabric, Mauritian firms often bought fabric from Cotona, the only Malagasy 
textile mill, which aided its revival following the collapse of its production for the domestic 
market. Additionally, Madagascar shared language and cultural affinities with Mauritius, 
which facilitated investments by the Franco-Mauritian and Indian-origin owners of Mauritian 
apparel firms.  
From 2000/01, AGOA provided preferential market access to lesser-developed countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa on the basis of a single-stage rule: requiring only assembly in the country 
of origin. These countries could use fabric originating from anywhere in the world. This Third 
Country Fabric derogation rule was extended four times, to 2007, 2012, 2015, and most 
recently to 2025. Countries that do not qualify as lesser-developed countries such as Mauritius 
and South Africa could only enjoy preferential market access through a three-stage rule, which 
required yarn spinning, fabric weaving or knitting, and assembly to take place in the country 
of origin. Hong Kong firms that already had factories in Mauritius anticipated the 
implementation of AGOA under the Clinton presidency by 2000, and started investing in 
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factories in Madagascar from 1997/98 (Gibbon 2003).2 In 2001 when Madagascar actually 
became eligible for AGOA, another flow of foreign investment was initiated by the Gulf states 
and by transnational producers from China and Sri Lanka. In the context of AGOA, some US 
buyers and agents established sourcing offices in Madagascar (Morris and Staritz 2014: 10).  
Contractions of the industry in the 2000s 
A major post-election political crisis and civil unrest in 20023 led most Asian and Mauritian 
firms to leave the country and resulted in a sharp contraction in apparel exports that fell by 
almost 50 percent. The number of apparel firms declined to around 84 in 2002 (Morris and 
Staritz 2014). Firms that stayed in operation could not import or exports goods through the 
main port, and thus many of them missed contract deadlines, unless they used airfreight (Morris 
and Sedowski 2006). Global buyers often cancelled orders (Cling et al. 2005) and the sourcing 
offices for MAST, Li & Fung, Eddie Bauer, Gap, Dockers, and Levi’s closed. There was a 
nationwide strike, and many firms closed their factories, with 80 percent of firms laying off 
workers and halting production for more than six months during the crisis.  
The industry rebounded rather quickly after the political crisis ended, with exports not only 
returning to the pre-crisis levels but also exceeding them. Exports to the EU did not rebound 
as quickly because some Mauritian firms did not come back, and some Hong Kong firms left 
permanently (Gibbon 2003; Cling et al. 2005; interview notes). As Cling and colleagues point 
out, the parent companies of Mauritian firms had become multinational, with factories in other 
parts of the world and thus were able to choose between production in Madagascar and 
production in other countries such as India, Bangladesh, and China (Cling et al. 2005: fn 8). 
French investment sustained exports to the EU, because French firms were either the 
subsidiaries of small firms in France, or were owned by French nationals living in Madagascar. 
These firms had no choice but to hold out through the crisis, and often had to start over with 
new buyers.  
EU exports did not decline around the MFA phase out end of 2004 whereas apparel exports to 
the US did. Many Asian-owned firms in Madagascar closed after the end of the MFA. This is 
2 The Mauritian apparel export sector originally emerged as the result of foreign direct investment from Hong 
Kong and European firms in the 1980s, combined with local Mauritian investors shifting out of the sugar industry 
and diversifying from the import trade. 
3 The December 2001 presidential election led to a half-year stand-off between the incumbent president Didier 
Ratsiraka and Antananarivo’s mayor Marc Ravalomanana, who contested the election (Ploch and Cook 2012). 
Official results of the election showed that Ravalomanana did not pass the necessary 50 percent threshold to avoid 
a run-off election. Ravalomanana refused to participate in a run-off election, citing electoral irregularities and 
claiming that he had won based on the first round. In February 2002, he declared himself the winner of the election, 
and the Malagasy High Constitutional Court agreed that a run-off was not necessary. Ravalomanana was sworn 
into office in May, but Ratsiraka continued to reject the election results. The two sides organized their supporters 
and engaged in limited armed confrontations: Ravalomanana based in the capital city and Ratisraka with a parallel 
government based in Toamasina, a coastal city in eastern Madagascar where the main port is located. Ratsiraka’s 
followers cut communications, roads, and bridges, leaving the capital city with no access to the sea or to basic 
supplies. The conflict ended in July 2002, when Ratsiraka fled to France. 
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because foreign direct investment by Asian transnational producers was driven largely by 
‘quota hopping’, seeking out low cost production locations that had not used up their quotas to 
the US market. Now they would be free to locate in countries previously restrained by quotas, 
most importantly China, which had higher labor productivity and efficiency. In contrast, 
French corporate and Mauritian firms, as well as locally owned firms, supplying the EU market 
did not leave. However, also not all Asian-owned firms left; it depended on their product line 
and type of buyer. Asian-firms producing basic denim and T-shirts were reducing their 
production in Madagascar, as they had been hit by intense international competition forcing 
down prices, while the outlook for Asian firms producing other products and producing for the 
EU market was stable, largely due to an increase in knit exports, especially jerseys and 
pullovers (Morris and Sedowski 2006). Furthermore, the decline in apparel exports after the 
MFA phase out was also lower than expected due to the significant depreciation of the 
Malagasy currency against the US dollar and Euro in 2004, which stimulated exports and 
reduced the costs of production just before the end of the MFA (Morris and Sedowski 2006: 
7). 
Between 2004 and 2008, manufactured exports (mostly apparel) overtook primary 
commodities as the largest source of export earnings, accounting for 74 percent in 2008 
(Fukunishi and Ramiarison 2012). In 2007, apparel exports reached their highest level 
accounting for US$ 725. The number of EPZ apparel firms rebounded to 131 in 2008, providing 
jobs to around 100,000 workers. The apparel export industry has an important social impact, 
providing jobs to workers who had not completed primary education, and paying wages that 
were substantially higher than that offered by the informal sector (Glick and Roubaud 2006; 
Fukunishi and Ramiarison 2014).  
The industry’s growth was disrupted again between 2008 and 2010 due to effects of the global 
financial crisis and the subsequent Eurozone crisis, and more importantly the political crisis 
and coup in 2009, which led the US to suspend the country’s AGOA status in 2010.4 Apparel 
exports to both the US and EU markets declined dramatically in 2009, and continued to decline 
after 2010 with the loss of the AGOA status. The share of the US market in total exports 
decreased from 43 percent in 2008 to 15 percent in 2010. By early 2012, the number of apparel 
export firms fell to an estimated 60 to 70 firms and around 55,000 employees (Morris and 
Staritz 2014). The massive closure of firms supplying the US market indicates that most firms 
preferred to switch production locations rather than switch markets, but some firms did survive 
by switching to other markets (Fukunishi 2013). Based on our interviews with foreign firms in 
4 Conflict between President Ravalomanana and Andry Rajoelina, who won the December 2007 election for 
mayor of Antananarivo, the only major political position not held by Ravalomanana’s political party, simmered 
throughout 2008 and erupted in early 2009. Rajoelina became a rallying point for the opposition political parties 
(Ploch and Cook 2012). Amidst growing public protests and violence between supporters of the two sides, 
Rajoelina attacked and occupied the presidential palace in March 2009, with support from the military. This attack 
resulted in the resignation of President Ravalomanana and the emergence of Rajoelina as head of a transitional 
government. The US, the African Union, and many other countries did not recognize the new president, as the 
leadership change occurred outside of democratic elections. The US suspended AGOA imports from Madagascar 
in 2010, because insignificant progress was made towards holding elections (Fukunishi 2013). 
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2017, we found that only one Asian firm switched from the US to the EU market after the loss 
of AGOA, and it only produced at low capacity in order to cover overhead costs; once AGOA 
status returned in 2015, it began producing for the US market again. A few Asian firms did not 
leave the country but rather closed the factory down; they owned the land and building (rather 
than renting a shed in an industrial zone) and did not want to sell in a ‘down’ market, and 
decided to wait for the return of AGOA. 
The remaining foreign and local firms focused on the EU market and on accessing new end-
markets such as South Africa, as shown in Figure 2. The elimination of duties within the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) combined with the South African 
government implementation of quotas on Chinese apparel imports between 2007 and 2008 sent 
South African buyers looking for regional suppliers in Mauritius, Lesotho, Swaziland, and 
Madagascar (Morris et al. 2016). The increase in exports to South Africa reflects the increase 
in Mauritian apparel exports to South Africa, and Mauritian-owned factories in Madagascar 
following suit. Locally owned firms also tried the South African market, but many indicated in 
our survey interviews that they had stopped supplying South African buyers because the prices 
were too low. 
Figure 2. Exports from Madagascar to the US, EU-15, and South Africa (in USD 
millions) 
Source: UN COMTRADE 2018, EUROSTAT 2018. Apparel represents HS92 61+62; exports represent 
partners’ imports. Data for EU-15 for the year 2017 are derived from EUROSTAT and converted in USD. 
There were no industrial policies in the apparel export sector during the 2000s. Morris and 
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the apparel export industry despite its employment and revenue generation importance for the 
country. Political elites were embroiled in conflict that could not be contained within the 
political institutions, and the country was on the brink of civil war twice. Nevertheless, despite 
important contradictions, the apparel export industry continued to grow. One of the main 
attractions of the country was the low wage costs and an abundant supply of labor, and over 
time, a pool of labor with experience working in apparel factories and thus an increasingly 
productive workforce. The infrastructural situation in Madagascar was not particularly 
competitive, as firms faced problems with customs, inland and sea transport, electricity costs 
and reliability, telecommunications, and rent increases (Morris and Sedowski 2006). The other 
main attraction for foreign direct investment was preferential market access, which shaped the 
flows of foreign direct investment with the increased international competition due to the MFA 
phase out, and the loss of preferential access to the US market under AGOA being most 
important.  
Recent rebound of the industry 
By 2016, Madagascar was again the second largest apparel exporter among Sub-Saharan 
African countries, after Mauritius. Two factors were key to the rebound of the Madagascar 
apparel export industry. The first was the return of AGOA in 2015, and the second involved 
Mauritian investment. Madagascar was reinstated as a member of AGOA in June 2014, 
following democratic elections in the country in late 2013. According to firms interviewed, 
exporting with AGOA preferences only became operational in February 2016, and firms have 
begun to search for US buyers. Thus, there is potential for growth in apparel exports to the US 
market and exports increased already from a low of USD 20 million in 2014 to USD 165 
million in 2017 (UN COMTRADE 2018). However, it is unlikely that foreign firms will return 
to Madagascar on the scale previously seen, as Madagascar is still a risky bet and Ethiopia 
provides a new opportunity for Asian firms looking to produce in Africa in order to benefit 
from AGOA. By the end of 2017, we identified only five new (or returning) Asian firms 
producing for the US market. 
In 2016, Mauritian firms that previously had investments in Madagascar returned, such as 
Compagnie Mauricienne de Textile—the largest firm in Mauritius, and other Mauritian firms 
expanded their existing activities in Madagascar by opening new factories. These 
developments were linked to both the perceived political stability and the return of AGOA as 
well as the general strategies of Mauritian firms in the region. 
In the late 2000s, in response to the MFA phase out and continued labor shortages and increased 
costs in Mauritius, large and medium-sized Mauritian firms adopted new strategies. They 
specialized in product design and offering services linked to fast fashion and smaller orders, 
while at the same time they kept basic products in order to balance their product portfolio and 
developed brands and retail shops in the domestic market. This strategy accelerated in recent 
years, as the European buyers of Mauritian firms want smaller orders of many different styles 
and colors. Therefore, the large Mauritian firms with investments in Madagascar retained a 
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headquarters in Mauritius focused on design and marketing and factories concentrated on fast 
fashion products along with fabric mills, and used factories in Madagascar to sew long run, 
basic products using fabric produced in Mauritius. Buyers allow longer lead times when it 
comes to long run, basic products, and thus factories in Madagascar could be competitive, 
despite requiring more time for transporting materials in and out of factories. The largest 
Mauritian firms are vertically integrated with their own fabric production, as a result of 
strategies pursued in the 1990s to make them more competitive given the distant location of 
Mauritius. This provided a means for small and medium Mauritian firms to survive by buying 
fabric locally. These fabric mills also supplied their companies’ apparel factories in 
Madagascar, as well as other firms located in Madagascar, especially locally owned firms, 
reducing their costs of sourcing fabric abroad.  
Apparel firms in Mauritius found it increasingly difficult to operate there, as very few people 
wanted to work in factories, and thus Mauritian firms increasingly moved their assembly 
production to Madagascar, and a few even moved textile production. They kept factories in 
Mauritius that produced fast fashion items and specialized in fabric development and product 
design, while their factories in Madagascar produced basic products, which were not affected 
by the longer lead time in Madagascar due to poor infrastructure and more limited port 
facilities.  
Another important change in Mauritian firms’ strategies that affected the development of the 
Madagascar apparel export industry was the shift to the South African market and development 
of regional production networks. The global financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis led to 
falling European demand and prices, due to currency depreciation, for apparel products 
produced by Mauritian firms. In response, Mauritian firms sought new markets, of which the 
most successful was South Africa. South African retailers were previously sourcing from Asia, 
but Mauritian firms received an advantage with the introduction of duty-free access under 
SADC and the quotas on Chinese apparel imports between 2007 and 2008. Mauritius firms are 
able to meet the double transformation rules of origin requirements in order to benefit from 
SADC trade preferences because there is significant fabric production in Mauritius. Hence, the 
South African market increased its share in total Mauritian apparel exports from barely 1 
percent in 2005 to 15 percent in 2016, but still remained behind the EU-15 (43 percent) and 
the US (28 percent) (see Table 1). In the case of Madagascar, apparel exports to South Africa 
also increased from 0 percent in 2005 to 14 percent in 2016, which was largely driven by 
Mauritian-owned firms. The EU-15 market accounted for 58 percent and the US market 
rebounded from 4 percent in 2014 to 17 percent in 2016 (see Table 2).  
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Table 1.  Mauritius’ end-markets of apparel exports (in USD million, and in %) 
Year 2000 05 10 14 15 16   2000 05 10 14 15 16 
                           
World 1,017 851 791 876 811 728               
EU-15  729 642 506 391 366 316   71.7 75.4 63.9 44.6 45.1 43.4 
United States  245 175 126 230 222 203   24.1 20.6 15.9 26.3 27.3 27.9 
South Africa  1 9 69 130 113 109   0.1 1.0 8.7 14.9 13.9 14.9 
Australia 1 0 6 10 13 13   0.1 0.0 0.7 1.1 1.6 1.8 
Czech 
Republic 
0 2 18 22 17 13   0.0 0.2 2.2 2.6 2.2 1.7 
 TOP 5 
 
95.9 97.3 91.6 89.4 90.1 89.7 
Source: UN COMTRADE 2018; apparel represents HS92 61+62; exports represent partners' imports.  
 
 
Table 2.  Madagascar’s end-markets of apparel exports (in USD million, and in 
%) 
Year 2000 05 10 14 15 16   2000 05 10 14 15 16 
                           
World 364 539 384 581 591 646               
EU-15  247 229 279 400 373 373   67.8 42.5 72.6 68.9 63.1 57.8 
United States  110 293 58 21 53 107   30.1 54.4 15.0 3.6 9.0 16.6 
South Africa  0 0 18 85 94 92   0.0 0.0 4.7 14.6 15.9 14.2 
Canada 1 7 6 8 8 8   0.3 1.4 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.2 
China 0 0 2 6 8 7   0.0 0.0 0.6 1.0 1.3 1.1 
 TOP 5 
 
95.9 97.3 91.6 89.4 90.1 89.7 
Source: UN COMTRADE 2018; apparel represents HS92 61+62; exports represent partners' imports.  
 
 
Regional integration goes even further as it does not only involve the end-market side but also 
input sourcing. Mauritian firms source most of their cotton from Sub-Saharan African countries 
and then spin, weave, or knit in Mauritius, and sell to apparel firms in Mauritius and 
Madagascar. As Table 3 regarding imports of cotton, yarn and fabric in Mauritius shows, 9 out 
of the top 10 cotton exporters to Mauritius are Sub-Saharan African countries. The number one 
exporter is India accounting for 25 percent of imports in 2017, followed by Mozambique (21 
percent), Zambia (12 percent) and Madagascar (9 percent). For yarn and fabric imports, there 
are no Sub-Saharan African exporters in the top 10, which makes sense as Mauritius has the 
most developed spinning and knitting/weaving facilities in Sub-Saharan Africa. The dominant 
exporters of yarn and fabric to Mauritius are China and India. For yarn imports in 2017, India 
accounted for 58 percent and China for 13 percent; whereas, for fabric imports, China 
accounted for 63 percent and India for 12 percent. For Madagascar, Mauritius ranked second 
for yarn and fabric imports in 2016, accounting for 18 percent for yarn and 15 percent for fabric 
imports, as shown in Table 4. Yarn imports accounted for less than a quarter of fabric imports 
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Table 3. Mauritius’ imports of cotton, yarn, and fabrics (in USD million, and in %) 
Year 2000 05 10 14 15 16 17 2000 05 10 14 15 16 17 
COTTON 
World 20 25 35 44 47 34 48 
India 1 10 7 2 0 1 12 4.0 37.7 20.0 3.6 0.9 3.9 24.8 
Mozambique 0 1 3 12 17 10 10 0.0 5.3 7.6 26.7 35.4 29.7 20.9 
Zambia 0 7 6 3 0 5 6 0.0 26.8 16.8 7.4 0.0 16.1 12.4 
Madagascar 0 0 0 9 10 4 4 0.0 1.1 1.0 21.2 22.1 10.6 9.3 
Tanzania 1 0 3 6 4 2 3 3.2 0.0 8.9 12.6 9.2 7.0 7.4 
TOP 5 7.2 70.9 54.2 71.5 67.6 67.3 74.7 
YARN 
World 164 104 77 73 59 60 72 
India 94 57 44 34 31 31 42 57.1 55.2 57.1 46.7 52.5 51.8 58.4 
China 16 8 9 13 9 8 9 10.0 7.7 11.7 17.2 15.1 13.9 12.5 
Pakistan 11 9 3 10 6 2 5 7.0 9.1 4.2 13.4 10.0 3.4 7.5 
EU-15 20 11 6 6 4 4 5 12.2 10.3 8.0 8.3 6.6 7.2 7.1 
Vietnam 0 0 1 2 2 4 4 0.0 0.0 0.7 2.4 3.4 5.9 4.9 
TOP 5 86.2 82.4 81.6 88.1 87.7 82.3 90.4 
FABRICS 
World 232 127 137 164 149 139 132 
China 77 60 80 108 101 90 82 33.3 47.7 58.3 65.4 67.8 65.2 62.5 
EU-15 42 27 25 23 17 18 18 18.1 21.7 18.3 14.1 11.4 12.7 13.6 
India 18 9 13 16 14 15 15 7.6 7.4 9.3 10.0 9.4 10.9 11.7 
Hong Kong, 
China 32 5 3 3 3 2 2 13.8 4.0 2.5 1.7 2.2 1.7 1.6 
Bahrain 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 1.4 1.4 
TOP 5 72.8 80.8 88.5 91.4 91.3 91.8 90.8 
Source: UN COMTRADE 2018; textile represents HS92 50-60+63. 
Table 4. Madagascar’s imports of yarn and fabrics (in USD million, and in %) 
Year 2000 05 10 14 15 16 2000 05 10 14 15 16 
YARN 
World 74 67 97 65 57 61 
China 45 55 44 24 23 26 61.4 81.3 45.7 36.3 39.8 41.9 
EU-15 10 5 16 13 10 11 14.1 7.5 16.2 19.4 17.3 17.6 
India 2 1 3 11 8 9 2.1 2.1 3.0 16.7 14.5 14.8 
Hong Kong, 
China 10 2 9 7 7 7 13.3 3.1 9.3 10.3 12.5 11.1 
Bahrain 1 0 1 4 3 3 1.2 0.7 1.1 6.4 4.7 5.7 
TOP 5 92.0 94.6 75.2 89.1 88.8 91.2 
FABRICS 
World 116 179 120 257 237 261 
Unspecified 24 20 10 110 88 78 20.6 11.1 8.3 42.7 37.1 29.8 
China 16 67 14 45 50 76 13.9 37.5 11.9 17.5 20.9 29.1 
Mauritius 31 17 21 47 42 40 26.7 9.5 17.5 18.1 17.7 15.4 
EU-15 18 17 56 24 26 26 15.5 9.5 46.3 9.2 11.1 10.1 
Pakistan 2 5 5 14 13 13 1.5 2.9 4.0 5.3 5.5 5.1 
TOP 5 78.3 70.6 88.1 92.9 92.4 89.5 
Source: UN COMTRADE 2018; textile represents HS92 50-60+63. 
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Characteristics of local apparel exporting firms 
In 2017, there were 68 apparel firms in Madagascar producing for export directly, or indirectly 
through subcontracting, meaning that they have no direct buyer relationships but work for 
another apparel firm based in Madagascar.5 Only four firms were integrated, meaning that they 
produced textile and apparel. Of the 68 firms, almost half were locally owned. Among the 32 
local firms, twelve exported mainly through subcontracting for other firms. There is one locally 
owned integrated firm producing woven fabric for its own apparel production and for supplying 
other firms, mostly local firms. As shown in Table 5, Mauritian firms constitute the majority 
of foreign firms, followed by Asian and European firms (the majority of which are French). 
There was one US firm, which was formerly a French and French-diaspora owned firm but 
recently a US corporation bought the majority share owned by the French firm. There was also 
one South African firm, which recently bought a Mauritian firm. The Mauritian firms (and the 
one South African firm) were more embedded and had more local decision-making power 
given their regional proximity and regional triangular manufacturing. Most of the Mauritian 
investors did not have global investment and sourcing strategies and their investments were 
taking place in the context of a regional integration and increasingly regional replacement 
strategy.   
Table 5. Overview of firms in the apparel export sector, 2017 
Ownership Total Integrated Apparel Subcontracting 
Local firms 32 1 19 12 
Foreign firms 36 3 26 7 
Mauritian 16 1 10 5 
European 6 6 
Asian 10 8 2 
US 3 1 2 
South African 1 1 
Total 68 
Source: Data collected by the authors. 
In addition to the textile and apparel firms, there are twelve input supplier and service provider 
firms, and two firms importing machinery for the Madagascar apparel export industry. Many 
input and service supplier firms relocated from Mauritius to Madagascar in the 1990s, 
following on the heels of the Mauritian apparel firms that were opening factories in 
Madagascar. By 2016, only a modest number of these firms remained, and they existed 
alongside locally owned firms and some other foreign firms that emerged to provide services 
to apparel export firms. The sector has several firms providing accessories, labels, and thread. 
For example, Tanacrex was established in 1983 in Mauritius and established a factory in 
5 It was difficult to confirm all operational apparel firms in Madagascar, because the government agencies and 
industry associations did not have complete lists. These numbers are based on contacting all the firms on lists 
acquired from the Economic Development Board of Madagascar, combined with asking firms about the list and 
about firms they knew existed that were not on the list. We hence realize that this list may not be complete. It is 
particularly likely that there were more subcontracting firms, because some firms mentioned that they 
subcontracted work but would not identify to whom and whether they were registered firms. 
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Madagascar in 1994, to produce buttons, labels, and other accessories for apparel firms. 
Another example is Coats, the world’s largest industrial thread producer and second largest 
supplier of zippers, which established a factory in Madagascar. Other input supplier firms are 
just sourcing firms, but buy in bulk and sell to apparel firms for which it would be difficult to 
source directly. There are several firms providing printing, dyeing, and embroidery services, 
some of which are locally owned, including by indigenous Malagasy. Thus, firms located in 
Madagascar have the option of outsourcing these services rather than having to provide them 
all in-house. There are also local providers of polybags and carton boxes, which are used by 
the locally owned apparel export firms. 
The EPZ law aimed initially at attracting foreign direct investment, and thus apparel EPZ firms 
were foreign-owned at the beginning (Fukunishi and Ramiarison 2012). But Malagasy firms 
started investing as EPZ firms as well and accounted for 11 percent of total EPZ firms in 1997, 
with no data on how many of these firms were in apparel. Fukunishi and Ramiarison (2012) 
report that in 2008, 23 percent of EPZ firms had Malagasy owners. Morris and Staritz (2014) 
estimated that there were 50-60 apparel firms with EPZ status in 2009, which they categorized 
into four types of firms based on ownership. They noted that 10 percent of the apparel firms 
had Asian ownership, 23 percent were Mauritian, 45 percent were European/French diaspora, 
and 15 percent were indigenous Malagasy, with the remaining firms owned by other 
nationalities such as American and Canadian. 
Types of local ownership 
Our definition of local firms in Madagascar includes indigenous Malagasy, Indian-origin 
Malagasy, and European-French diaspora. 6  This definition emphasizes locally embedded 
entrepreneurs and their firms, which remained in Madagascar even when internal and external 
shocks caused foreign firms to close down their factories and leave the country. Of the 32 local 
firms, 15 are indigenous Malagasy firms, 9 are European-French diaspora, 7 are Indian-origin, 
and 1 is identified as Chinese-origin Malagasy.7  
French foreign direct investment was crucial to the emergence of the Madagascar apparel 
export industry, but French investments took different forms. Some French investments 
became locally embedded with decision-making residing in Madagascar and others were 
locally embedded from the beginning through investment by the French-diaspora living in 
Madagascar. There is also French investment that continued to have headquarters and decision-
making abroad in France, which includes four French corporate firms in 2017. In the 1990s, 
11 percent of investment in apparel export firms came from local residents, many of whom had 
French nationality or some kind of French connections, and aimed to export to the European 
6 Hence, we expand the categorization by Morris and Staritz (2014) differentiating between French corporate 
firms, which are considered foreign firms, and French/European-diaspora firms, which are considered local firms, 
and identifying a third local firm category, Indian-origin Malagasy firms. 
7 This last firm (U-Firm) did not consent to participate in the survey, so we could not confirm the background of 
the owner, but we were told by other firms. There is a very small group of Chinese-origin Malagasy in 
Madagascar. 
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market, especially France (Cling et al. 2005). These French investors (and a few other 
European nationalities) resided in Madagascar with their families often initially having partners 
in France, but over time becoming the majority owners and the firms becoming locally 
embedded. French-diaspora investors developed linkages with French and Mauritian investors 
through joint ventures, working in their firms, buying out these firms, or through 
subcontracting. Partnerships and subcontracting were facilitated by language and cultural 
affinities. Some French-diaspora investors initially had help from contacts in France to find 
buyers, and accessed investment capital from French-diaspora friends in Madagascar that 
owned businesses in other sectors or from European banks or minority partners based in 
European countries.   
Indian-origin Malagasy also had strong French connections, as most have French citizenship 
for reasons specific to the nature of decolonization in Madagascar. The Indian-origin 
community dominated the economy prior to independence, despite being a very small part of 
the population, and continued to dominate afterwards, owning some of the largest diversified 
business groups in trading, real estate, telecommunications, and banking.8 The independence 
government was reluctant to give the minority Indian community Malagasy citizenship. As a 
result, some Indian-origin Malagasy have French citizenship, which they were given during 
colonial rule, and this is the case for most of the Indian-origin Malagasy that own apparel firms. 
The Indian-origin investors in apparel exports typically were part of families that had 
diversified business groups, and as a result, they do not have problems accessing capital as 
other businesses can be used as collateral with the banks when applying for investment loans. 
The only locally owned textile mill, Cotona, belongs to an Indian-Malagasy family that now 
has one of the largest diversified business groups in Madagascar. 
In contrast to the other two groups, the owners of indigenous Malagasy firms find it much more 
difficult to access investment and working capital finance, and therefore, they typically started 
out by subcontracting for other firms. Their owners tend to be from the Malayo-Indonesian 
ethnic group, which dominates in the highland areas, including the capital city Antananarivo 
and the neighboring city of Antsirabe. All of the apparel exports firms are located in these two 
cities due to the availability of infrastructure, better-educated workers, and proximity to the 
airport (Morris and Sedodwski 2006).  
Characteristics of local firms 
Table 6 provides a summary of the key characteristics of local firms in terms of ownership 
category, firm’s age (year it started exporting), size (number of employees), main products 
8 Records show that Indians came to Madagascar as traders at least from the late eighteenth century, and they 
continued to migrate during French colonial rule in the first half of the twentieth century. They were traditionally 
traders, carrying Indian textiles to exchange for other goods, particularly gold, and they started distribution 
systems within the interior. Indian merchants eventually came to monopolize trade in Madagascar. For this reason, 
the Indian-origin community played a dominant role in the Madagascar economy post-independence, despite 
being a small part of the population. 
CAE WORKING PAPER 2018: 3 16 
exported, main end-markets, and function within the global value chain. Several of the local 
firms have been exporting since the 1990s, including firms across all types of ownership but 
predominantly European-diaspora firms. Most of the remaining firms that directly export have 
been doing so since the early 2000s. Notably, the firms that are more recent in age are all 
indigenous Malagasy firms that are subcontracting for other firms, and almost all of them were 
started by people with previous experience working in foreign firms or also local apparel 
exporting firms (but mostly European-diaspora owned local firms). Notably, indigenous 
Malagasy firms are smaller in size compared to the other two categories of local firms, 
employing on average 98 workers compared to 847 for the European diaspora firms and 611 
for the Indian-origin firms.9 
Local firms generally produced niche products and higher value products compared to most 
other less developed apparel exporter countries, and compared to the Mauritian, European, and 
Asian owned foreign firms in Madagascar, which mainly produced basic products on a large 
scale (basic knitwear, woven trousers, medical uniforms) and intermediate products (causal 
and formal shirts, sportswear, lingerie). The main categories of products among local firms 
include: (1) children’s clothes (14 firms); (2) high-end workwear and corporate wear (8 firms); 
(3) knitted pullovers (3 firms); and (4) casual and high-value fashion clothes (4 firms). Only
three local firms produced basic apparel products.
9 We excluded the largest Indian-origin firm, which is an integrated textile and apparel firm with 7244 employees, 
as it is an outlier. 
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Table 6. Overview of the local apparel export firms in Madagascar, 2017 






Main products Main end 
markets 
Function 
A-Firm 2001 3000 ED Knitted pullovers EU, US, SA FOB. Dye/ 
knitting. 
B-Firm 2003 550 IOM Sleepwear, 
children’s wear 
EU, SA FOB 
C-Firm* 1998 1200 ED High fashion EU CMT, some 
FOB 
D-Firm 2008** 600 ED Women’s fashion EU FOB, some 
ODM 
E-Firm* (1990s) 447 ED Children’s wear EU FOB 
F-Firm 2000** 400 ED Children’s wear EU FOB, some 
ODM 
G-Firm 1992 200 ED Workwear EU FOB, CMT 




I-Firm 1998 900 ED Knitted pullovers EU, US, SA FOB. Dye/ 
knitting. 
J-Firm 1996 400 IOM Children’s wear EU FOB 
K-Firm 2012 subcon 
2014 tried 
direct 
600 IOM Sportswear, T-
shirts 
Trying for 




sub, no stable 
direct buyers 
yet 
L-Firm 1996 700 IOM Children’s 
clothes 
EU FOB 
M-Firm 1996 520 IOM Children’s 
clothes 
EU CMT, FOB 




O-Firm 1994 subcon 
1999 direct 
300 IM Winter jackets, 
Sub con: 
children’s clothes 
EU, Australia FOB, CMT 






Q-Firm** 2010 500 ED Workwear EU CMT, FOB 






S-Firm 2001 63 IM Children’s 
clothes, luxury 
EU CMT, FOB 
T-Firm 1998 40 IM Children’s 
clothes, luxury 
EU mostly CMT, FOB, 
design 





V-Firm* IM Knitwear -- CMT, FOB 
W-Firm 2011 50 IM Mostly children’s 
wear 
-- CMT-sub 
X-Firm 2003 190 IM Mostly children’s 
wear 
-- CMT-sub 
Y-Firm 2014 160 IM Workwear -- CMT-sub 
Z-Firm* 2014 IM Workwear -- CMT-sub 
AA-Firm* 2016 23 IM Workwear -- CMT-sub 
BB-Firm* 2016 IM Workwear -- CMT-sub 
CC-Firm 2014 50 IM Workwear -- CMT-sub 
DD-Firm 2016 150-259 IM Pullovers, 
knitwear 
-- CMT-sub 
EE-Firm* 2007 1500 IOM Military uniforms -- CMT-sub 
FF-Firm* 2017** 150 ED Children’s wear -- CMT-sub 
Source: Data collected by the authors.   
Notes: *Firms that declined to participate in the survey. ** This firm bought an existing factory. 
European diaspora= ED; Indian-origin Malagasy= IOM; Chinese-origin Malagasy=COM; Indigenous-Malagasy= IM 
CAE WORKING PAPER 2018: 3 18 
The main end-market is the EU, which 13 firms out of the 21 firms (for which we have 
information on end-markets10) solely supply. Another 7 firms supply the EU together with 
other end-markets including the US, South Africa, and to a lesser extent Australia, Japan, and 
Réunion (a French island). Most firms are involved in FOB production with an important share 
doing FOB and CMT depending on the type of product and the related buyers. Few firms 
provide design and hence also supply partly on an ODM basis and, in addition to the knitting 
firms that have to do fabric and apparel production jointly, only one firm is involved in FOB-
textile. An important share of indigenous firms does CMT-subcontracting for other local and 
foreign firms.  
Measuring the technological capabilities of local firms in apparel exports 
We developed a technological capabilities matrix specified for the apparel global value chain, 
which we then used as the basis for designing a survey questionnaire to capture information on 
the categories of capabilities.11 We administered the questionnaire to 23 of the 32 local export 
firms through face-to-face interviews between November 2016 and November 2017. The 
remaining nine firms declined to participate in the survey. We scored the local firms on the 
function they perform within the apparel global value chain as well as on indicators of four 
categories of capabilities: product, production process, end-market, and linkages. Of the many 
indicators we included in the matrix and the questionnaire, we selected only a few indicators 
for the technological capability scoring exercise, in order to make it comparable among the 
firms. The selected indicators for product, production process, end-market, and linkages 
categories include both quantitative and qualitative data. Furthermore, we tried to balance 
indicators that measure quantity with indicators that measure quality within each category of 
capabilities. Table 7 presents the technological capabilities scores of the 23 local exporting 
firms. It shows the score on each indicator, the sum score for each category of capabilities, and 
an aggregate score for overall technological capabilities. Before we get to Table 7, we explain 
the scoring method on each indicator. The method generally follows the method used to score 
local firms in the Ethiopian apparel export sector, also to make the two cases comparable (see 
Staritz and Whitfield 2018). 
The first column in Table 7 indicates the score based on function within the apparel global 
value chain. In Madagascar, local firms were involved in CMT-subcontracting, CMT, FOB, 
ODM, and FOB-textile which means FOB with firms’ own textile. CMT-subcontracting scores 
1, CMT scores 2, and FOB scores 3. Knitting firms (producing pullovers and other knitted 
products such as hats and gloves) were scored as FOB-textile because knitting and sewing the 
knitted parts together are still two production steps, and knitting firms have dyeing facilities 
that are normally found at vertically integrated firms or textile mills. We gave one integral for 
each additional function – hence, there are firms that produce on a FOB basis and also provide 
10 10 of the 11 firms where we have no end-market information are subcontracting firms.  
11 The matrix is presented and discussed in Staritz and Whitfield (2017). The survey questionnaire is available in 
the appendix of the first working paper analyzing the survey results from the Ethiopia apparel case study, see 
Whitfield and Staritz (2017).  
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design (ODM) which scores 4, but there are also firms which produce on a FOB basis using 
their own textile (FOB-textile) which scores 4 as well. If a firm provides design and uses its 
own textiles in apparel exports it scores 5. Some local firms carry out more than one function, 
as indicated in Table 6 above. We scored a firm based on the dominant function. If a firm 
carries out two or more functions of equal importance, the scores were averaged. In the overall 
score on function, we assessed scores of 1 or 2 as low, as subcontracting requires CMT 
production but importantly differs from CMT in the end-market capabilities category; a score 
of 3 is medium; and a score of 4 and 5 is high. For scores less than a whole integer, we round 
up as even being partly involved in for example FOB, ODM, or textile production means that 
firms have invested in and fulfill the related capabilities. 
The second category of capabilities is product, which captures the complexity of products that 
a firm produces and the variety of products. The main products of local firms were assessed as 
basic, intermediate, or complex. To capture complexity we used a combination of what firms 
reported on complexity, the firms’ main types of products, and the products’ unit values. The 
type of product alone cannot be directly related to complexity, as there can be, for example, 
women’s trousers that are simple and women’s trousers that are intermediate. If firms exported 
more than one main product, we did the scoring for each of them and then calculated the 
average score. As local export firms specialize in different product segments (children’s clothes 
with smock and embroidery; high-end workwear and corporate wear; knitted pullovers; casual 
and high-value fashion clothes), a direct comparison is difficult. Therefore, we first ranked 
firms within the different product segments and then aligned the scores between the different 
types of products as much as possible. Children’s clothes with a high smock and embroidery 
content were for instance scored as complex as this involves very delicate handiwork. 
Intermediate products with limited handiwork were however kept as intermediate. Knitted 
pullovers were also generally scored higher than other product types given their more 
complicated production process.  
The number of different products that a firm exports indicates a firm’s ability in dealing with 
more types of products, which requires specific knowledge about each product and skills to 
manage different product requirements. This is also linked to buyers’ preference for firms that 
can produce a variety of products and hence may ensure stability in buyer relationships. 
Product variety also reduces risk, as the supplier firm does not put all its effort into one product 
and finding buyers for only this product. There is no global industry standard on variety of 
products. We assessed firms with only one export product as low and gave them a score of 1. 
Firms exporting two to three products scored 2, as the step from one to two products is 
particularly important, as this requires already managing different requirements. Firms with 
four or more export products scored 3, as this requires substantially more management 
coordination and capabilities. Very similar products were counted as one product. 
In the third category, production capabilities include labor productivity (costs), not on time 
delivery (reliability), and internal reject rate (quality). We do not directly cover working capital 
or inventories, lead or throughput time, labor turnover and absenteeism rates, and training 
expenditure, for reasons discussed in Staritz and Whitfield (2018). Labor productivity is 
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measured in terms of how long it takes a firm to make its main product(s) in relation to the 
international standard, which varies according to the work content, number of operations, 
length of seams, fabric types, stitching accuracy needed, sewing technology to be used, and so 
on. Firms were scored using the international standard of benchmarking with China, where we 
defined low as below 60 percent of the international standard, medium as 60 to 75 percent, and 
high as above 75 percent. A problem with scoring productivity is that it varies considerably 
within firms as the result of low volumes, changing products and styles frequently, and 
changing buyers. Hence, we asked firms to provide an average. Even a larger problem in the 
case of Madagascar was that firms specialized in different product segments for which a direct 
comparison of labor productivity is not possible. As for the case of product complexity, we 
first ranked firms within the different product segments and then aligned the scores between 
the different types of products as much as possible. Subcontracting firms were ranked on 
productivity based on assessments of the firms for which they subcontract. 
On-time delivery captures the percentage of products delivered on-time and in-full to 
customers with no defects and with the right documentation. Meeting the delivery deadlines 
set by buyers is a larger challenge for FOB firms that are in charge of and responsible for input 
sourcing, in contrast to CMT firms where buyers are responsible. If local firms were late on 
delivery, or later than a maximum amount of days past the delivery deadline that the buyer 
allows, then buyers generally reject the order and local firms lose the payment, and even lose 
the buyer. Not on time delivery was scored as a percentage of all deliveries. Taking into account 
the global industry standards, ‘often’ was defined as 5 percent of deliveries or more and scored 
1, ‘sometimes’ as between 2-4 percent and scored 2, and ‘hardly ever’ as 1 percent or less and 
scored as 3. 
There is a difference between customer return rates and internal reject, rework, and scrap rates. 
Customer returns reveal quality satisfaction of buyers but offer an insufficient indication of 
internal quality performance. Firms may have poor internal production systems, but provide 
quality products by following stringent checks at the end of the process, which is costly. Hence, 
firms also need to reduce their internal reject rates in order to provide sustainable and efficient 
quality performance. The internal reject rate was measured as the share of internally rejected 
products. These products can then be reworked, if possible, or scrapped. For scoring, we 
considered the global industry standards. A 5 percent and above reject rate was scored as 1, 
between 2-4 percent reject rate as 2, and 1 percent and below reject rate as 3. 
The fourth category of end-market capabilities refers to firms’ ability to manage relationships 
with buyers, which involves, among other things, marketing, communication, account 
management, negotiations and audits, focusing on the number of buyers, and the stability of 
the relationships. Subcontracting firms were not scored on these indicators as it focuses on 
relationships with actual buyers, including intermediaries such as agents, and not to other firms 
based in Madagascar. While we acknowledge that developing subcontracting relationships 
with other locally based firms also requires certain capabilities, they are considerable lower 
compared to establishing and maintaining direct buyer relationships. It is assumed that the 
higher the number of direct buyers that the firm has, the higher the capability of the firm. 
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Having more buyers reduces risk, allows a better bargaining position, and shows that the firm 
is able to manage more buyer relationships. We scored a firm 1 if it depended on one to two 
buyers, scored 2 if it depended on three or four buyers, and scored 3 if it had five or more 
buyers. Many firms in Madagascar have significantly more buyers but we stayed with this 
scoring as it should also capture firms and countries entering apparel global value chains, which 
typically have less buyers than in the case of Ethiopia. Through number of buyers, we also took 
into account how many end-markets firms are supplying. Firms were asked to rate their 
relations with their main direct buyers as stable, somewhat stable or ad-hoc. If they rated their 
relations as ‘stable’ or ‘somewhat stable’, we crosschecked this rating with what firms reported 
as their history with buyers. We also took into account how many buyers were lost by firms. 
Hence, a subjective assessment was applied in assessing firms’ buyer relations as unstable/ad 
hoc (scoring 1), somewhat stable (scoring 2), or stable (scoring 3).  
The final category of technological capabilities is linkages. This category refers to a firm’s 
ability to leverage linkages with actors and institutions outside the firm in order to access 
knowledge and resources with which to improve the performance of the firm. Public 
institutions are important, as they often provide access to finance at below market rate, 
subsidize the costs of learning, and are important in generating skilled labor. Other firms – 
foreign and local firms – and foreign experts are an importance source of tacit knowledge for 
local firms, especially in export industries. This is especially the case in countries and industries 
where there is no pro-active industrial policy supporting the export sector or where public 
institutions do not have the knowledge and experience to support local export firms. Linkages 
between local firms can be facilitated by a strong industry association. The scoring on each of 
these indicators was based on several qualitative and quantitative questions, on the basis of 
which a subjective assessment was made of low linkages (scored 1), medium (scored 2), or 
high (scored 3).  
For the links with other firms and experts indicator, we assessed a firm’s direct interaction and 
cooperation with other local and foreign apparel firms (including subcontracting relations) and 
participation in collaborative schemes during their development. The assessment took into 
account past as well as present interactions, and includes whether a firm was pro-active in 
acquiring knowledge through visiting factories in other countries, attending trade fairs 
regularly, and sourcing and paying for foreign experts on their own. For the links with public 
institutions indicator, we assessed a firm’s interactions with public sector institutions in terms 
of being able to react to policy changes or influence policies and being able to access and take 
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Analyzing the technological capabilities of local apparel exporting firms 
The technological capabilities scores of the 23 local exporting firms presented in Table 7 show 
that there is variation in the overall capability scores from low to high-medium. Three firms 
score high-medium, three firms medium-high, four firms medium, three firms medium-low, 
four firms low-medium, and three firms low, while three firms have mixed scores. The label 
‘mixed’ refers to the fact that a firm’s sum scores on the different categories of capabilities 
ranged from low to high, and thus did not indicate an overall trend. In this section, we discuss 
firms’ performance and trends within each category of technological capability, before 
analyzing overall trends within the aggregate capability scores.  
Analysis of scores within capability categories 
Local firms varied significantly in terms of the functions they perform within the apparel global 
value chain. One firm provided FOB-textile and design functions (I-Firm), and hence it is the 
firm with the highest score on the function capabilities. This is because it is a knitting firm and 
hence produced textile and apparel as well as performed design for the knitted fabric. The other 
knitting firm (A-Firm) also scored high because it has to do textile and apparel production 
jointly. There is only one other firm that is involved in FOB-textile, the only vertically 
integrated firm producing woven textile used for their own apparel exports and also selling to 
other firms in Madagascar (H-Firm), but it was not willing to participate in the survey. 
Altogether, three local firms are involved in FOB-textile, but notably they are involved in 
different types of textile production compared to the three vertically-integrated foreign firms 
which are all producing knit fabric. 
In addition to I-Firm, three other firms carried out design functions for their apparel products, 
developing their own seasonal collections (D-, R-, and T-Firms). D-Firm does FOB production 
with design for women’s casual clothes with light fabrics sourced regionally from Mauritius. 
R- and T-Firm do largely CMT with design in children’s clothes with smock and embroidery,
selling luxury children’s clothes, mostly for small French boutiques. R-Firm is even the
designer for one specific brand and has a share in that brand label. The two CMT-firms (P- and
S-Firms) are also in the higher end children’s clothes segment, selling to luxury boutiques in
the EU and the US, for which they require luxury fabric that has to be imported and for which
they have not the financial means to do the sourcing. These two firms do small elements of
design as well, but largely only CMT. So, they are very similar to the other two CMT firms but
only differ in their degree of design involvement. It seems, however, that all these CMT firms
also do FOB for a smaller share of their exports if they can source local fabric from the locally
owned woven textile mill; if they have to import fabric they do CMT.
In addition to D-Firm, there are four other firms that are 100 percent producing on a FOB basis 
(F-, J-, B-, and L-Firms), all of which are producing children’s clothes of intermediate to high 
complexity for the European market. This would seem to conform to the trend that European 
buyers prefer suppliers to work on a FOB basis. There are four firms that do FOB and CMT 
CAE WORKING PAPER 2018: 3 24 
(G-, M-, O-, and Q-Firms), but there is no clear trend as to why. G-Firm, the workwear firm 
that is among the highest performing, has several European buyers, some of which prefer FOB 
basis and some of which prefer CMT; in addition, one of its long-term buyers recently bought 
the shares of one of the local shareholders and became a majority shareholder, making it logical 
for the firm to switch to supplying on a CMT basis. With M-Firm, half of its production is for 
one European buyer, which uses fabric from a firm in Mauritius, but even then, the buyer pays 
for the fabric 20 percent of the time. Rather than seeing CMT as a ‘lower’ function, it is a risk-
balancing strategy, as prices are higher with FOB but there is also higher risk with sourcing 
and storing the fabric. Q-Firm, the other workwear firm, has only two buyers, both European, 
but one prefers FOB and the other CMT. The remaining firm, O-Firm, is the only indigenous 
Malagasy firm in this category. For high-end products with expensive fabrics, the buyer sends 
the fabric; when the fabric is less expensive, the firm sources itself or negotiates part of the 
payment for the product in advance in order to finance the fabric.  
There are eight firms that are involved in subcontracting and hence scored 1 on function 
capabilities; only K-Firm scored 1.5 as it was in the process of negotiations with direct buyers, 
and it was the only subcontracting firm that was actively seeking direct export buyers. 
Subcontracting is important in Madagascar given the interest of some larger local firms as well 
as a few foreign firms to subcontract parts of their production to other firms to deal with high 
and flexible volumes without taking on board the costs and risks of expanding in-house 
capacity. For the subcontracting firms it is a possibility to start exporting without having to 
establish and maintain direct relationships with buyers and therefore being able to focus solely 
on production. However, subcontracting is challenging as margins are very low and product 
types and specifications change with each order, which requires important adaptations and 
reduces productivity. Even though subcontractors do not actively search for direct buyers, with 
the exception of one firm, CMT-subcontracting is not perceived as a longer-term position. 
Nevertheless, developing direct relationships with buyers is challenging, particularly as most 
buyers demand FOB suppliers.  
Among the subcontracting firms, three firms (N, Z, and W-Firms) produce children’s clothes 
for local and foreign firms, and one firm (DD-Firm) produces knitted sweaters for foreign firms 
(largely Mauritian). This is not surprising given the large number of firms in these product 
segments. A very interesting case is one firm (G-Firm) that encouraged and supported a few of 
its employees to establish their own firms to do subcontracting work for the firm at which they 
remained employees (Y, Z, and CC-Firms). This strategy benefited both sides. G-Firm pursued 
subcontracting as a way to expand without running into diseconomies of scale within its firm. 
But it also wanted to ensure quality and on-time delivery, and thus sought to support managerial 
staff who had worked in G-Firm and understood its production practices and had a loyalty to 
the firm. On the other side, the five indigenous firms benefited from the direct assistance from 
the owners of G-Firm in handling the logistics and financing of setting up an apparel export 
firm as well as from constant advice and a flow of information regarding product and 
production capabilities. Thus, all eight subcontracting firms are producing largely for local 
firms and Mauritian firms, and for EU end-markets. The exception is K-firm, which 
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subcontracts also for Asian firms and seeks to enter the US and South African end-markets, 
and produces more basic, non-niche products such as sportswear and T-shirts as well. 
All local firms produce intermediate or complex products except for Q-Firm, which produces 
basic workwear, and to some extent K-firm (which had a slightly higher score because in 
subcontracting it produced a variety of products, but it is negotiating to supply more basic 
products with direct buyers). Local subcontracting firms largely produce for other local firms, 
which make intermediate products. Complex products are in luxury children’s clothes and 
pullovers with a large degree of handiwork (smock, embroidery, pleats) as well as high-end 
workwear and luxury women’s apparel. The variety of products is more mixed, with some 
firms scoring high but most firms scoring medium, which means they produced two or three 
different types of products. Most larger firms score high and produce around five to six main 
types of products. All of the firms that scored low on variety of products are subcontracting 
firms. Most firms had a sum score of medium or high on product capabilities; four out of the 
five firms that scored low are subcontracting firms. Q-Firm, the other firm to score low, 
produces a limited range of basic workwear. The subcontracting firm K-Firm is trying to find 
direct export buyers in basic sportswear products, but it was largely carrying out subcontracting 
production of a medium range of intermediate goods at the time of the survey. 
Sum scores on production capabilities were lower than on product capabilities with only one 
firm scoring an overall high (G-Firm), eighteen  firms scoring an overall medium, and four 
firms scoring an overall low, including the three lowest performing subcontracting firms but 
also P-Firm. Most firms were better on not on time delivery and internal reject rate compared 
to labor productivity. On productivity, the production of children’s clothes with a large smock 
and embroidery content is very labor-intensive and the most luxurious products are produced 
in firms that resemble artisanal production (which is the case of R, T, and S-Firms). There are 
few ways to increase labor productivity on apparel with a large degree of handiwork, in contrast 
to apparel products that travel down an assembly line from sewing machine to sewing machine. 
The knitting firms, A-Firm and I-Firm, have fully or partially automated knitted machines, 
which leads to high labor productivity, compared to hand-flat knitting machines, but the 
looping section where panels are put together into pullovers is very labor-intensive and it is 
difficult to increase labor productivity there given the difficult nature of the task. G-Firm, the 
only firm to score high on labor productivity, does not produce products with handiwork and 
it is the only firm that uses the lean production system, which it also helped its subcontracting 
firms to implement in their production processes.  
Most firms scored high in terms of always meeting their delivery deadlines, with the exception 
of the lowest performing subcontracting firms. Four firms generally use airfreight for their 
exports, including the three firms that do small orders of luxury children’s clothes (R-, T-, and 
S-Firms) and P-Firm (also children’s clothes with light weight). The other firms ship by sea.
The firms involved in intermediate children’s clothes (M, L, J, F, and B-Firms) only do summer
and winter seasons and seem to have some room for negotiation on delivery time as they are
important suppliers for the same group of buyers. The high scores on delivery deadlines for
knitting firms are explained by the fact that they do not have to purchase fabric (only yarn),
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have automated production, and outsource hand flat production. Several firms also source 
fabric from the one local textile mill. Furthermore, mills in Mauritius and accessories are 
locally available, which reduces lead times as well as delays and uncertainty regarding delivery 
time. The larger firms that have repeated orders of the same products and are not involved in 
fashion keep a large inventory of fabric (G-Firm). The quality of production, indicated by 
internal reject rates, was generally medium; with only the three firms producing luxury 
children’s clothes (R-, S-, and T-Firms) and J-Firm performing high. Four firms scored low, 
which included two of the lowest performing subcontracting firms but also two direct exporting 
firms, one of which (P-Firm) recently opened a new, larger factory and was struggling to get 
good production processes in place.  
On end-market capabilities, subcontracting firms were not scored since they do not have any 
direct export buyers and were hence given a low sum score on end-market capabilities. These 
eight firms were the only ones with low overall end-market capabilities scores. Among the 
direct exporting firms, most firms had a high sum score (eleven firms), indicating that they had 
stable relationships with a large number of buyers. Some local firms had 30 to 40 buyers and 
produced a range of products for them in terms of complexity. Often the high-performing firms 
would produce a large volume of basic to intermediate products with low unit prices for a few 
buyers, and then produce intermediate to very complex products in small orders with higher 
unit prices for numerous other buyers. They also had strong buyer stability, having produced 
for several ‘core’ buyers for many years. For example, G-firm had had its four core buyers for 
ten years at the time of the interview. The firms producing luxury children’s clothes often have 
many buyers for whom they produce small quantities with very high unit prices. S and T-Firms 
produce for luxury brands sold in France, but are not able to disclose that information due to 
the nature of contracts with buyers.  
Of the four firms with medium end-market capabilities, three of them had fewer buyers (Q-, 
O-, and P-Firms), and R-Firm and O-Firm had less stable relations with its buyers. R-Firm is 
somewhat of an outlier, in that the firm has grown and contracted (in size and number of 
buyers) several times as a result of the political crises, thus its stability of buyer relations 
received a lower score. But R-Firm produces for high-end buyers such as Ralph Lauren (US) 
and Baby Dior (EU), as well as Vichey and Cie, Kidiwi, Cala Coin in Europe, and Tiny Pyxis 
in Japan. All local firms were affected by the political crises, but this firm particularly as it was 
the only indigenous firm in luxury children’s clothes that had a large firm doing big volumes. 
Other indigenous firms were small, and stayed small with the exception of P-Firm, which 
however only grew recently.  
Regarding end-markets, ten firms solely supplied the EU market. The other six firms supplied 
the EU market plus one or two other markets, which included the US, South Africa, Australia, 
and Japan. The South African end-market is only supplied by three local firms, and always in 
addition to the EU market, confirming that Mauritian firms are driving the increase in exports 
to South Africa. Hence, there is a clear focus on the EU as an end-market and within the EU 
also on France, leading to important end-market concentration. A caveat has, however, to be 
made regarding the US market, as most firms were not producing for the US because of the 
CAE WORKING PAPER 2018: 3 27 
loss of AGOA. With the renewal of Madagascar’s AGOA status in 2015, which only became 
operational in early 2016, firms were beginning to seek US buyers again when we did the 
interviews. Only the two pullover firms (A and I-Firms) were already producing for the US 
again. P-Firm never dropped its US buyer that it supplied through an agent. R-Firm did not 
completely lose its US buyer as it continued to do small orders sent by air. In this segment we 
can also see the trend that EU buyers require expensive yarn, US buyers acrylic yarn (synthetic) 
with higher volumes and lower prices, and South African buyers cheaper yarns and more basic 
products. No other firms were selling to the US at the time of interview. 
Local firms generally score lower on linkage capabilities than the other categories of 
capabilities, because all firms score low on links with public sector institutions. The 
government does not have any industrial policy targeting the apparel export sector and 
generally is not interested in supporting the sector. Therefore, it is difficult for firms, or their 
industry associations, to influence government policy, and there were no public support 
programs from which firms could benefit. The only policies that were stated by firms as helpful 
were the EPZ regulation and exchange rate policies that support exporting. Further, there are a 
few policies in place that generally facilitate exporting in the context of the EPZ law – for 
example, the possibility to import inputs for apparel production duty-free and to get the value-
added tax on these imports refunded. However, the government often takes a long time, 
sometimes several years, to refund the value-added tax on imported inputs used in apparel 
exports. Scores of 1 on links with public institutions meant it was not possible to score higher 
than medium (and doing so required a high score on links with other firms and experts).  
In contrast, firms had stronger links with each other and with foreign firms and experts, but 
these generally did not occur through formal organizations such as industry associations but 
rather through personal networks and relations. There is no single industry association, but 
rather several types of business associations in which local firms participated. There was an 
export association linked to the EPZ status, but firms were not automatically members but had 
to pay rather high membership fees that were not adapted to firms’ size, which meant that most 
of the small firms were not members. The export association had a permanent secretariat, but 
its main objectives were to liaise with the government on policies affecting EPZ firms, and not 
to link firms to each other and as a means to share information. Therefore, many of the medium 
and small-size firms were a member of the French or US chamber of commerce, depending on 
their end-markets, which provided marketing advice and information. Some of the firms, 
largely European diaspora firms, established an industry association called Textile Made in 
1998 to provide a platform for knowledge sharing and collaborative schemes among firms and 
to support smaller firms, especially indigenous Malagasy firms. It was the idea of the EU 
Development Fund, which advocated the cluster system and provided consultants to set it up, 
and the French aid agency financed it. It largely provided training for operators and managers 
at the smaller firms and financed attendance at trade fairs. However, when these external actors 
stopped supporting Textile Mada in 2011, it largely stopped functioning. None of the firm 
owners had the time to work as executive in the organization, so they tried paying for an 
administrator, but it seems that the firms lost interest after a few years and stopped financing 
the activities of Textile Mada. 
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Rather, the strong links among firms have occurred through three types of informal relations: 
ethnic-based networks, networks among firms that produce similar types of products, and 
subcontracting. There is no formal organization among the different types of owners, but 
collaborative schemes and information sharing tend to take place among firms whose owners 
come from the same ownership type: European-diaspora, Indian-origin Malagasy, and 
indigenous Malagasy. Firms also collaborate more closely with firms that produce the same 
types of products, but this tends to reinforce the ethnic networks. For example, Indian-origin 
Malagasy firms producing children’s wear tend to have closer relations and support each other. 
But there are also links across ownership type, for example in the supportive relations between 
C-Firm and O-Firm, the only firms producing high-end fashion products. The other type of
link is subcontracting relations, which have provided an important channel for indigenous-
Malagasy investors to enter the sector. Notably, some indigenous-Malagasy firms have gone
on to grow into medium-sized firms with a few direct buyers, while others remain in the
subcontracting function. In this case, it seems to matter which firms indigenous-Malagasy
investors link up with, as some provide active support in helping the subcontracting firm learn
and grow, while others provide none.
In addition to these relations, most firms have benefited from links to Mauritian expertise. In 
particular, many firms have Mauritian production managers, who tend to circulate among the 
firms. Proximity to Mauritius and the contraction of the Mauritian apparel export sector meant 
that many Mauritians came to Madagascar looking for managerial level jobs. Some of these 
experts also came with Mauritian foreign firms and later left these firms and worked for local 
firms. The absence of apparel-specific training and education institutions in Madagascar made 
access to experienced Mauritian managers very important.  
Analysis of overall capability scores and trends 
In terms of the aggregate technological capability scores, we identify three main trends that are 
based on the importance of product types and ethnicity in understanding dynamics among local 
firms in Madagascar’s apparel export sector. The first trend is that the specialization of local 
firms in niche and higher value products, and the specific types of products, are related to 
specific buyers and end-markets, and they also determine function in global value chain and 
production processes. Therefore, to an important extent, product types drive capabilities in the 
other capability categories. The most important product specialization is in children’s wear, in 
which 44 percent of the local firms are involved, and workwear in which 25 percent of local 
firms are involved. Additionally, 12 percent of firms are involved in casual and high-end 
fashion products, and 9 percent in knitted pullovers with only 9 percent in basic, non-niche 
products (see Table 8 below).  
The specialization in children’s clothes is of particular importance. It involves products with 
intermediary and high levels of complexity, including for an important sub-set of firms, luxury 
products with a high content of smock and embroidery. Smock can be produced with machines, 
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but in Madagascar it is hand-made and it is the only country besides Vietnam that exports hand-
made smock products. Therefore, competition is largely within Madagascar, not with China or 
Bangladesh. The focus on children’s clothes with smock and embroidery is the result of an 
artisanal tradition in Madagascar, which is speculated to have emerged during the French 
colonial period. Many firms have capitalized on this local skill and tradition, supplying 
European buyers and especially the French market and also small boutique buyers. European 
buyers supported several firms to enter this product category in order to have more suppliers 
from which to choose. Hence, this product specialization brings with it certain labor-intensive 
and quality-focused production processes and the necessity to be at least partly involved in 
design as firms often contribute their own design element by providing prototypes or even 
offering collections to buyers. It also means that textile inputs are of high value and hence 
expansive which makes it difficult for small local firms and particularly indigenous ones to 
finance importing these inputs. Several of the smaller indigenous children’s wear firms are 
only involved in CMT and only where fabric can be soured locally in FOB – but in combination 
with an involvement in the design process. 
Specializing in high-end workwear and corporate wear has been a good strategy for G-Firm. 
The founder of the firm established a relationship with a French buyer early on, and when the 
2002 political crisis hit, this buyer remained loyal when the fast-fashion buyers stopped 
sourcing from Madagascar. As a result, the firm turned to specializing in workwear and sought 
additional buyers in this product segment, and initially buyers such as Decathlon that would 
allow it to source woven fabric from the local textile mill. The advantage of this product 
segment is that the orders are regular and use the same materials, so the firm can have a large 
inventory of fabric and work constantly, and also by producing the same kinds of products in 
constant orders, can increase its productivity. For example, this firm also produces children’s 
yellow raincoats for Petit Bateau, and is the sole supplier of this product for the buyer. Q-Firm, 
the other workwear firm, has a different set of buyers in low-end workwear, but it seems that 
G-Firm may be introducing it to its buyers and helping to shift its product portfolio.
The specialization in knitted pullovers is largely the result of Hong Kong firms, many of which 
previously operated in Mauritius before moving to Madagascar. Knitted pullover on handflat 
knitting machines (as opposed to the new automated ones) are the most labor-intensive apparel 
to produce, and thus were the first product to be offshored from Mauritius to Madagascar, 
creating a lot of experienced workers. For knitted pullovers a specific production process is 
required that demands that fabric and apparel is produced jointly leading to vertical integration 
of these firms and the import of yarn. Many firms are also involved in design at the knitting 
stage. The owners of A and I-Firms actually had experience working in Hong Kong and 
Mauritian firms producing in Madagascar before they left to start their own firms.  
There is a strong focus among local firms on the EU market which is linked to the type of 
products but also to other path dependencies, linked to French foreign direct investment, 
French-diaspora, and several crises in which firms closed down that were geared towards the 
US market including the MFA phase out that was more important for US-focused firms and 
most importantly the AGOA loss. Currently, some local firms are in the process of trying to 
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find new US buyers. Some firms are also seeking new markets in Australia and Japan, and 
several local firms tried the South African market, but said that prices are too low and products 
too basic, and that this is not what local firms do. So the South African market only covers a 
very small percentage of local firms’ exports. Rather, local firms specialize in intermediate and 
complex products in specific product segments with higher prices. For these types of products 
the EU market is better suited and particularly for high value added or luxury children’s wear 
with smock and embroidery for which the largest market is even only in France. Market 
segmentation not only covers types of products but also specific requirements: the EU buyers 
present in Madagascar generally demanded smaller orders and high quality which comes along 
with higher prices, the US buyers wanted synthetic products and large volumes, and the South 
African buyers sought basic, cheap products at low prices. Some local firms pursued market 
diversification strategies and created a diversified portfolio, but this involved only the larger 
and higher capability firms. The other firms largely remained focused on the EU market and 
specific market segments therein related to their types of products.  
Given that firms do intermediate to complex products with many different types of fabrics, 
vertical integration reaches its limits and would require a large fabric mill that is able to produce 
different types of fabric. The local woven textile mill is a large fabric mill with high capabilities 
for different types of fabrics. Its specialization in light woven fabrics created some path 
dependencies as local firms specialize in products that can be made with light woven fabrics, 
or the woven fabrics from textile mills in Mauritius (from which only two local children’s wear 
firms mentioned sourcing). Local firms did however not source knit fabric from Mauritius, in 
contrast to Mauritian firms that do that for value added T-shirts with two even setting up knit 
textile mills in Madagascar. This might be related to path dependency as local firms initially 
entered into children’s wear or workwear based on woven fabric.  
The second trend is that ethnicity among local firms plays an important role, and there is a 
correlation between ethnicity of the firm owners and product and related buyers and end-
markets. Table 8 maps firms according to ownership type and product type.  
Table 8. Mapping of local firms by product type and ownership type 
Total number of 








Pullovers 3 firms (9%) A-Firm, I-Firm -- DD-Firm






T-Firm, W- Firm, X-Firm





2 firms (6%) C-Firm -- O-Firm
Casual, fashion 2 firms (6%) D-Firm H-Firm -- 
Basic/non-niche 3 firms (9%) -- K-Firm U-Firm, V-Firm*
Note: * Neither of these two firms participated in the survey, so this is based on information gathered from other 
sources and thus only partial data. 
CAE WORKING PAPER 2018: 3 31 
Most European-diaspora and Indian-origin local firms specialized in children’s wear producing 
intermediate products and selling to the same group of French buyers; they somewhat compete 
with each other, but also specialize in different aspects of children’s wear. These firms also 
outsource a large amount of hand embroidery and smock work to groups of workers on a piece 
rate basis. The indigenous Malagasy firms are even more strongly focused on the children’s 
wear segment, and particularly, the higher value added children’s wear with smock and a lot 
of handiwork. These indigenous firms fall into two categories. The first group produces on a 
subcontract basis for other local firms (X, N, and W-Firms). The second group produces luxury 
children’s wear (P, R, T, and S-Firms), which has a higher content of labor-intensive smock 
and embroidery using original designs, in small volumes for high-end large buyers or small 
buyers with boutique shops in Europe and to some extent the US. The high value of luxury 
children’s clothes with smock and embroidery, with high labor-intensity and original design, 
allowed indigenous Malagasy firms to export. However, the majority of them are very small 
firms run more like a family business than an industrial production and are based on small 
orders that can be shipped by air. Only one indigenous Malagasy firm (P-Firm) succeeded in 
scaling up. 
The two European-diaspora pullover firms produce a range of products for top European 
brands, and use automated knitting machines with electronic design elements. There is only 
one indigenous Malagasy firm producing pullovers and this is on a subcontracting basis for 
Mauritian firms because the yarn must be imported and can be expensive to finance, especially 
in luxury materials. That is also why the two European-diaspora firms and foreign firms that 
produce pullovers engage in subcontracting, and others rely on buyers to finance the yarn. For 
the former, it seems that the large local firms and the foreign firms perform a kind of financing 
function for smaller firms doing a kind of CMT activity – handflat weaving instead of 
assembly. For these firms, it is more expensive to hire more workers than to outsource. So they 
provide handflat machines largely to groups of women that are generally not registered as firms 
and ask them to produce the basic parts.  
The two European-diaspora firms in workwear produce different types of products. One 
produces complex products for top European brands, and subcontracts to the five indigenous 
Malagasy firms that it helped to create in the mid-2010s (G-Firm), and the other produces 
intermediate products. Hence, the indigenous Malagasy firm producing workwear is a special 
case where G-Firm actively supported some of its own managerial staff to start apparel firms 
that subcontract from it. There are two European-diaspora firms specializing in fashion 
products – one in high-value ladies fashion products for top European brands and the other in 
casual ladies’ summer fashion clothes with a large element of own design. The one Indian-
origin Malagasy firm in casual fashion wear is the vertically integrated firm. There is also one 
indigenous Malagasy firm producing high-value fashion. Notably, this indigenous firm also 
had initial relations with G-Firm, which helped the owner to start subcontracting for French 
foreign firms in the late 1990s and eventually to export directly. The indigenous firm produced 
some high-end fashion products, as a result of path dependencies stemming from its first buyer, 
but it struggles to get more orders in high-end fashion and thus fills its capacity with 
subcontracting or producing for new end-markets in Réunion and Australia.  
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There were three firms in basic, non-niche products (one Indian-origin Malagasy and two 
indigenous) which are outliers – one of which was in the process of securing direct buyers and 
the other two were not available for interviews, so we cannot assess whether they are 
succeeding or not. 
Taking the first two trends into account, it is useful to look at trends across firms in terms of 
the aggregate technological capability scores by grouping them according to product type and 
ethnicity or local ownership type. Table 9 does this by adapting Table 6 to include the aggregate 
capability scores. Based on this, the third trend that is apparent from Table 7 is that aggregate 
technological capability scores correlate with ethnicity, but not entirely.  











Children’s wear F-Firm: Med-High
(E-Firm is sister company
of D-Firm, so likely Med-
High)















(EE-Firm not in survey, 
but subcon and in the 




(AA-Firm and BB-Firm not 
in survey, but similar to Z-
Firm: Low-Med)  
High-end fashion (C-Firm not in survey, but 
likely Med-High or High-
Med) 
-- O-Firm: Med
Casual, fashion D-Firm: Med-High (H-Firm not complete 
data in survey, but likely 
High-Med) 
-- 
Basic/non-niche -- K-Firm: Med-Low (U-Firm and V-Firm not in 
survey, not enough data to 
say) 
Firms with the highest aggregate technological capabilities scores are all owned by European-
diaspora, except for H-Firm, which is Indian-origin Malagasy. H-Firm is not included in the 
formal scoring because the survey data was incomplete, due to reservations from the firm 
owner to answer some questions. However, we visited the firm, which is the only locally owned 
vertically integrated woven textile and apparel firm in Madagascar, and observed production 
processes and products. Based on this information, we put the firm in the category of high-
medium. Among the European diaspora firms, only FF-Firm and Q-Firm have lower 
capabilities. Firms with medium range technological capabilities are more likely to be owned 
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by Indian-origin Malagasy, with the exception of two indigenous Malagasy firms (O-Firm and 
R-Firm) that score medium and one indigenous firm that scores medium-low (Y-Firm). All
low capability firms are indigenous Malagasy firms, although not all indigenous Malagasy
firms scored low, particularly the three medium or medium-low firms mentioned above.
There are three firms with what we call ‘mixed’ scores. The absence of a clear trend can be 
explained with a greater discussion of the firms’ backgrounds. B-Firm, an Indian-origin 
Malagasy firm, used to produce predominantly basic women’s casual wear, such as pajamas, 
but lost much of that production around 2013 to suppliers in China and Bangladesh, and shifted 
to specialize in children’s and babywear that is more complex. The firm is part of a large 
family-diversified business group, and the owner seems to struggle somewhat in FOB exports 
(as opposed to its import businesses) but it still has high end-market capabilities. It does not 
have strong linkages with other firms or experts. S-Firm and T-Firm are indigenous Malagasy 
firms producing luxury children’s clothes with smock and embroidery on a CMT basis, and in 
the case of T-Firm, with own designed collections, and they scored high on end-markets due 
to a significant number of quite stable buyers. They also do not have strong linkages with other 
firms or experts. 
Interestingly, there is important networking among local firms – and between local and 
particularly Mauritian and European foreign firms – and local networks are also linked to 
ethnicity and product types as networking is largely confined within ethnic and product groups.  
However, the indigenous firms that are directly exporting used to have relations with some 
European-diaspora firms in the context of Textile Mada and still do within certain product 
types. The indigenous subcontracting firms also have links to particularly European-diaspora 
firms which is most pronounced for the workwear segment. Directly exporting indigenous 
firms tend to also regularly attend trade fairs in their niche products and do seem to be actively 
seeking information. 
Conclusion 
The overall technological capabilities scores of local firms in Madagascar’s apparel export 
sector are largely medium (ten firms), with three firms having higher capabilities and seven 
firms lower capabilities. Six of the firms with lower overall capabilities are subcontracting 
firms, but it also includes one CMT firm, and two subcontracting firms have medium overall 
capabilities. Local firms score particularly high on the product capabilities category given the 
higher value and niche product specialization that most local firms have. Only three local firms 
are in the basic, non-niche segment, and some of the others even specialize in luxury products, 
particularly in the children’s wear segment. This specialization explains high product 
complexity and to some extent, it also explains high product variety. The production capability 
category is largely medium, given high scores on not on time delivery and (to a lesser extent) 
high scores on internal reject rate but lower scores on labor productivity. The latter is also 
related to the type of products, as products with a high content of handiwork have limitations 
concerning labor productivity compared to products with only classic assembly activities. End-
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market capabilities are largely high due to the large number of buyers per firm as well as buyer 
stability, particularly for the larger firms. The exception is the seven subcontracting firms that 
score low on end-market capabilities. Linkages capabilities are medium or low, owing to the 
low linkages with public institutions for all local firms, as there is practically no sector-specific 
industrial policy by the Malagasy government, and the relatively high linkages with other firms 
and experts. On function, there is large variation: from subcontracting and CMT to FOB to 
FOB-textile and ODM, with many of the direct exporting firms pursuing different functions 
depending on the product and the buyer.  
Notably, these results are determined by the specific product specialization of local firms and 
related buyers, end-markets and global value chain dynamics. In particular, the specialization 
in children’s wear of intermediate and high value, and the high content of hand-made smock 
work, which only one other country produces, give local firms a special position. Additionally, 
the specialization in knitted pullovers and higher-value workwear, and to a lesser extent high-
value fashion wear, brings with it special buyers that differ in several aspects to the typical 
global buyers sourcing long-run basic products from a large number of suppliers in low-income 
countries. It is difficult to assess end-market concentration, given that the country recently 
reacquired its AGOA status and some firms are in the process of trying to find new US buyers. 
Nevertheless, for most local firms the EU market is still the more logical market given their 
product specialization, and for some specific products, local firms supply mainly the French 
market. Some local firms tried the South African market but realized that this market does not 
fit their type of products given the low prices offered by South African buyers. The 
specialization in certain product types demands that local supplier firms fulfill certain functions 
such as fabric production for knitted pullover firms and design involvement for higher value 
and fashion products, particularly in the luxury segment. What is demanded in terms of 
production processes and what can be achieved is also related to product specialization.  
Dynamics in the Malagasy apparel sector cannot be understood without taking into account 
different ownership categories. This involves foreign firms, given the large share of more 
locally embedded foreign direct investment related to Mauritian regional triangular 
manufacturing strategies and European, particularly French, investors that have links to the 
European-diaspora community in Madagascar (Morris and Staritz 2014). Regarding local 
firms, it involves the different characteristics, opportunities, and challenges of European-
diaspora, Indian-origin Malagasy, and indigenous Malagasy firms. Overall technological 
capabilities are correlated with these different ethnic groups. Firms with the highest 
technological capability scores are European-diaspora firms, firms with medium range 
technological capabilities are more likely to be Indian-origin Malagasy firms, and all low 
capability firms are indigenous Malagasy firms, although three indigenous Malagasy firms 
scored medium.  
What explains these different experiences in technological capability building? Access to 
finance was important. In the absence of industrial policy, European-diaspora and Indian-origin 
firms could access finance through foreign banks, through financiers in other sectors of the 
Malagasy economy, or through owning or being part of families with other businesses. In 
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contrast, the owners of indigenous Malagasy firms found it much more difficult to access 
investment and working capital finance. But more important than access to finance was getting 
access to and building production knowledge that ensured high productivity, quality, and 
meeting delivery times. In developing such technological capabilities, partnerships with 
foreign firms were initially crucial, in the form of joint ventures and subcontracting relations 
between largely Mauritian and European corporate investors on the one side and European-
diaspora and Indian-origin firms on the other side. These two types of local firms could also 
use their cultural affinity and connections to France to access buyers and maintain relationships 
with them. The specific product niche markets also explain the learning that took place within 
these local firms, due to the more limited competition, higher unit value and particularly larger 
margin for error in these products.  
Indigenous Malagasy firms faced the highest challenges in building technological capabilities 
and learning. Learning was facilitated through their linkages with other apparel-exporting 
firms, either through working at them or through subcontracting relations, or both. 
Subcontracting for other firms played an important role for indigenous firms, and 
subcontracting opportunities were available because of the existence of more embedded 
foreign firms from France and Mauritius and of more developed local firms. Of the fifteen 
indigenous Malagasy firms, nine were subcontracting. Furthermore, for the six direct exporting 
indigenous Malagasy firms involved in CMT and FOB, and some also in design, 
subcontracting played an important role in starting their business and developing capabilities. 
The subcontracting relationships allowed indigenous Malagasy firms not only to learn export 
production but also to enter exporting through only learning production capabilities first, which 
involves lower costs and lower risks than establishing direct buyer relationships. This was 
critical as indigenous firms typically faced particular difficulties in making contact and 
maintaining relationships with buyers and had more limited access to finance compared to 
European-diaspora or Indian-origin investors, which affected their ability to finance fabric 
imports, for example. Remaining in such subcontracting relations is problematic as unit prices 
are low, requirements varying, and relationships often unstable. However, there seem to be 
some subcontracting firms that have established quite stable subcontracting relationships to 
European-diaspora firms based on certain product specialization and mutual benefits, 
particularly in the children’s wear and workwear segments.  
While the apparel side is quite developed, there is no local textile sector of any scale and thus 
limited capabilities in that regard. There is only one locally owned textile mill producing a 
variety of light weight woven fabrics, which also sells to other firms. There are a few other 
vertically integrated firms producing knit, but they do not sell fabric to other firms. 
Interestingly, regional sourcing has increased in importance in Madagascar, but the import of 
yarn and particularly fabric from Mauritius was not driven by local firms. Only very few local 
firms sourced woven fabric from Mauritius and none sourced knit fabric. On the end-market 
side, the increasing apparel exports to South Africa were not driven by local firms, with only 
few firms having tried to export and mostly finding prices too low. Rather, these regional 
production networks were based on the strategies of Mauritian-owned firms that use their home 
country based textile mills and design teams for their apparel firms in Madagascar and have 
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further built a rather strong presence in the South African apparel market that they supply from 
Mauritius and Madagascar. In contrast, regional experts and managerial staff from Mauritius 
played an important role also for local firms. Due to the proximity to Mauritius, and the 
declining apparel industry there, a large pool of experienced managers in production and 
marketing with knowledge of the region was available in Madagascar. Hence, local firm 
owners without experience could relatively easily ‘buy in’ production knowledge compared to 
other African countries such as Ethiopia.  
On the surface, Madagascar is an unlikely country to have developed an apparel export sector 
given the difficult country-specific conditions related to physical and bureaucratic 
infrastructure, the non-existence of sector-specific industrial policy, and most crucially 
repeated political instability and crises that led to foreign firms and buyers leaving the country. 
Nevertheless, it has developed one, and more importantly, one that includes local firms with 
significant levels of technological capabilities, even though the capability building processes 
were segmented along ethnic and product lines. In these learning processes, the specific types 
of international linkages played an important role. This is firstly related to the specific niche 
and higher value product specialization that comes with a particular set of buyers and their 
global value chain dynamics where competition is more limited, relationships are closer and 
margins for error higher. Secondly, this is related to the type of foreign direct investment, which 
was more embedded due to diaspora linkages with local firms and regional production 
strategies. 
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